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Book Review: War, Clausewitz and the Trinity
Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies,
military history and defence literature, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning.
In this book, Thomas Waldman explores Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for
understanding war – the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance and passion. Waldeman
displays his formidable scholarly grasp of Clausewitz’s wide-ranging oeuvre, as well as his own
talent at depicting it in a gripping, insightful and illuminating manner, writes Ben Mueller.
War, Clausewitz and the Trinity. Thomas Waldman. Ashgate. February 2013.
Find this book:  
Few thinkers in the f ields of  polit ics and strategy are as instantly recognisable
as Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century military historian f rom Germany best
known f or his maxim, “War is merely the continuation of  polit ics by other
means.” Unf ortunately f or Clausewitz, owing to the catchiness of  this quote,
it is by now commonly taken to encapsulate his contribution to polit ical
thought. Thomas Waldman’s War, Clausewitz and the Trinity is a convincing
antidote to this one-dimensional view, f ocusing on the conceptual trinity that
Clausewitz argued makes up war: passion, chance, and polit ics. The book is
an accessible introductory text f or students of  polit ics and war, as well as a
research study that aims to provide a clearer depiction of  Clausewitz’s
thought and its relevance in today’s world.
Chapter 2, f ocusing on the historical and methodological bases f or
Clausewitz’s work, is in many ways one of  the most compelling of  the book. Clausewitz’s
rejection of  f ormalistic theories that treat war as a mechanistic phenomenon and aspire to
uncover the laws that governing it—yes, that strain of  thinking was around already back then—
pre-empted the great debates in the 1950s between historically-minded polit ical scientists and
those of  a ‘scientif ic’ persuasion who pressed f or the adoption of  quantitatively driven
methodologies to study polit ics.
Anyone who wants to get a f eel f or the stakes of  this debate would do well to caref ully read Waldman’s
authoritative depiction of  how Clausewitz navigated his way between those espousing the methods of  the
‘hard’ sciences, and those advocating the historicised study of  individuals and of  chance. By pragmatically
combining the two approaches — analysing the mechanical aspects of  war by deducing generalizable
principles, but f orever stressing the conditionality of  said principles owing to the constant inf luence of
randomness and of  f ree-thinking individuals — Clausewitz came up with powerf ul methodological insights
that Waldman lucidly synthesises: “Theory can teach but cannot prescribe … f or [Clausewitz], laws were
not applicable in war, as they may be in the sciences. He emphasised the dif f iculty of  developing concrete
theory because of  the of ten large distance between cause and ef f ect, the continuous interaction of
opposites, the impact of  changing conditions and the play of  intangible f orces that theory could never quite
def ine.”
At the same time, Clausewitz understood theory as having “f ulf illed its main task when it is used to analyse
the constituent elements of  war, to distinguish precisely what at f irst sight seems conf used.” This is a
powerf ul take on the role of  theory in social af f airs: it can be used to shed light on complexity, and gain an
understanding of  processes that shape given phenomena; but because the f ocus of  inquiry “is directed at
an animate object that reacts” (i.e. humans), there is an inherent limit to what theory can achieve in the f ace
of  the sheer complexity that underpins social activity. The essence of  sound theory is not that it can be
applied in a mechanical f ashion, but that it aids judgement. Clausewitz’s insights on the relationship
between the universal and the particular are grist to the mill f or those who f eel that contemporary social
science would do well to embrace a less doctrinaire and paradigm-driven approach to research.
Waldman then proceeds to take the reader on an exploratory journey across the analytical terrain on which
Clausewitz studied war, beginning with the underlying role of  context as providing the essential meaning
and social attributes of  war. Clausewitz’s insights into the decreasing relevance of  history as a guide to the
present with the passage of  t ime are gripping, but the f act that Waldman goes on to cover context in its
historical, cultural, legal, ethical, polit ical, geographic, technological and economic instantiations brings to
mind Prof  Colin Gray’s observation that “One can of f er too big a picture.”
Waldman then presents Clausewitz’s writ ings on polit ics, chance and human passion, respectively, as the
three key driving f orces that combine, co-opt and co-constitute one another in an impenetrably complex
triad that makes up the essence of  war.
Each of  the three core chapters begins with a historical survey of  Clausewitz’s theoretical ancestors,
bef ore explaining how Clausewitz’s thinking was shaped by given events in his lif e, and then exploring the
ins and outs of  his ideas as well as presenting some of  the problems his analyses give rise to.
Unf ortunately, since all three of  Clausewitz’s conceptual pillars are relatively mundane and easily made
sense of , the discussion lacks the kind of  spark that drives Waldman’s study f orward in Chapter 2.
Whilst the book is dotted with historical examples and depictions of  specif ic ideas using actual events,
none of  these are probed beyond a f ew lines at most. That is somewhat surprising, insof ar as Waldman
makes a point in Chapter 2 of  explaining Clausewitz’s conviction that history “provides the theorist with a
vast reservoir of  experience that ‘counts f or more than any amount of  abstract truths.’” Waldman generally
f ails to take heed of  this important insight, which is doubly unf ortunate, because when he does creatively
apply Clausewitz to make a substantive point about some aspect of  military thinking, it tends to make f or
an impressive display of  how a great thinker ’s output can be harnessed to make sense of  a contemporary
dilemma. For instance, Waldman uses Clausewitz’s work on uncertainty and unpredictability to expose the
inherent and indeed timeless f laws of  one of  today’s inf luential doctrines about the f uture of  war—
Revolution in Military Af f airs, which argues that a complete synthesis of  the inf ormation-communications-
technology domain must be developed and applied across the military spectrum (‘Full Spectrum Dominance’)
to achieve an overpowering supremacy of  intelligence and resources, obviating the possibility of  militarily
challenging the hegemon. What Clausewitz recognised and Waldman intelligently applies to the
contemporary world is the f act that no matter how much inf ormation is accumulated, no system of  systems
can be created until the “problem of  converting inf ormation into knowledge and knowledge into action” is
solved and that “new solutions spawn new problems and new dependencies create new vulnerabilit ies.” In
that passage, Waldman gets at the very heart of  the dynamics driving the intelligence game onwards, with
an account that casts doubt on the thesis that computers will f undamentally alter warf are, and instead
simply add a new ingredient to a dish whose basic recipe remains unchanged. This is gripping, challenging
stuf f —if  only this kind of  thinking f ormed the basis of  the book instead of  being an anomaly.
War, Clausewitz and the Trinity discusses the research of  one of  the great post-Enlightenment thinkers on
human af f airs in a tremendously insightf ul and accessible manner. Waldman’s book is heartily recommended
f or those who wish to read a primer on Clausewitz. His is a ref reshing perspective on war and polit ics,
because it f ocuses on intuit ively essential — if  unquantif iable — elements of  social lif e. Clausewitz’s f rank
and transparent acceptance of  the limits of  theory are sobering f or any student of  the social sciences. By
presenting this arguments, Waldman’s book is a convincing remedy f or those peddling a simplistic
understanding of  Clausewitz as an advocate of  the primacy of  polit ics over war.
At the same time, the book f ails to live up to its potential because of  an overly conservative structure. Had
Waldman illuminated Clausewitz’s thinking through a series of  detailed case studies he could have penned a
genuinely ground-breaking study. It is somewhat baf f ling that Waldman intentionally de- limits his inquiry by
expressly stating that his study does not engage in detailed empirical analysis of  contemporary conf lict. As
a result, much of  the book’s tone is one to be expected of  a deep textual analysis and a meta-survey of
Clausewitz’s precursors and later crit ics. This is entirely acceptable, and makes f or a rigorous study. Yet
one wonders whether this book could have been much more than what remains an academic treatise
appealing to a relatively narrow circle of  specialists.
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